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 Kim Davis, beloved conservative celebrity and religious 
freedom advocate, was in the headlines yet again in the wake of the Sixth 
Circuit’s opinions in Ermold v. Davis, 936 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2019), and 
Yates v. Davis, and Miller v. Caudill, 936 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2019), this 
past August. All three cases center around Kim Davis, a Kentucky county 
clerk, and her refusal to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples after 
the Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), ruling in 2015. The 
Ermold and Yates appeals centered on Davis’s sovereign or qualified 
immunity as the County Clerk for Rowan County, Kentucky, while the 
Miller appeal focused on whether the Commonwealth of Kentucky, 
Rowan County, or Kim Davis in her individual capacity is liable for the 
payment of attorney fees. Ermold, 936 F.3d at 432; Miller, 936 F.3d at 
446. 
At first glance, these cases appear simple. The majority opinion 
writes that Davis’s claim of immunity is what complicates matters — and 
it does. However, Ermold v. Davis brings to light another issue: what 
level of scrutiny, if any, should apply in same-sex marriage 
discrimination cases.  
As in the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell, the Sixth 
Circuit in Ermold v. Davis declined to invoke the tiers-of-scrutiny 
analysis present in many other constitutional questions. Ermold, 936 F.3d 
at 437. Using the silence in Obergefell to her advantage, Davis argued 
that rational-basis scrutiny should apply to her decision to not issue 
marriage licenses in Rowan County, Kentucky. She contends that her 
right to act on her beliefs against same-sex marriage is protected by 
Kentucky’s Religious Freedoms Restoration Act (RFRA), Ky. Rev. Stat. 
§ 446.350, and that Kentucky has a “compelling interest of the highest 
degree” in accommodating Davis’s religious views.  
This argument is familiar ground in the tension between equal 
protections for same-sex marriage and religious objectors. For example, 
in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), a Catholic 
licensed foster care agency argued that Philadelphia targeted CSS for 
acting on its religious beliefs when discriminating against same-sex foster 
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parents, in violation of Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, which provides that “an agency shall not substantially burden a 
person’s free exercise of religion.” While the majority opinion in Ermold, 
chose to avoid the tiers-of-scrutiny question entirely, the concurrence by 
Judge John K. Bush gives this argument some credence. Judge Bush’s 
concurrence signals that rational-basis scrutiny may gain some favor as a 
means of analyzing future same-sex marriage discrimination cases.   
A state’s discriminatory activity enjoys a presumption of 
constitutionality if the end goal is permissible, and the means are 
rationally designed to achieve that goal. Ermold, 936 F.3d at 441.  
Rational-basis review is a relatively low bar to pass. To fail, the 
government’s actions must be so unrelated to its stated purpose so as to 
be irrational. Moral disapproval of same-sex marriage, on its own, cannot 
pass even rational-basis scrutiny, as established in Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620 (1996), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Despite 
this lower standard available within the tiers-of-scrutiny analysis, some 
scholars have proposed that the Court’s jettisoning of tiers of scrutiny in 
Obergefell provides freedom and more flexible standards for same-sex 
marriage proponents. However, this freedom for its proponents 
necessarily means that its opponents can also use this freedom to lower 
the standard of scrutiny and apply a rational-basis standard instead.  
That is just what Judge Bush has done in Ermold v. Davis. He 
notes that Obergefell left many questions unanswered—namely, which 
level of scrutiny should apply to same-sex marriage discrimination, or 
when and how to apply that analysis. Judge Bush states that he didn’t 
believe that the Supreme Court would act to “abolish tiers-of-scrutiny 
analysis for all marriage regulations without explicitly telling us it was 
doing so.” And, in finding a total ban on same-sex marriage 
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court did not mean that the tiers-of-
scrutiny analysis is inapplicable when reviewing marriage restrictions 
amounting to less than a total ban. 
Judge Bush finds nuance in Davis’s argument for rational-basis 
scrutiny and opens the door to a lower level of scrutiny in same-sex 
marriage discrimination cases. He finds a distinction between Davis’s 
restriction of marriage licenses to same-sex applicants in Rowan County 
specifically and a total prohibition on marriage. Although he agrees in his 
concurrence that Davis’s actions would not survive even rational-basis 
review because of her anti-LGBTQIA+ animus, Judge Bush puts forth 
rational-basis as the appropriate level of scrutiny and explores Ermold v. 
Davis through this lens. 
Judge Bush’s analysis in the concurrence is telling, however, 
2019] OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE 
 
compared to opinions on similar issues in other courts. The Third 
Circuit’s unanimous decision earlier this year in Fulton v. City of 
Philadelphia, 922 F.3d at 146–47, reads similarly to the majority opinion 
here. Fulton was also a simpler case at its core: a Catholic foster agency 
refused to place children with same-sex couples, and such discrimination 
was determined to be unconstitutional post-Obergefell. Both Fulton and 
the majority opinion in Ermold ignore the tiers-of-scrutiny question 
altogether. Until the applicable level of scrutiny is clarified in these cases, 
courts may choose to apply rational-basis scrutiny, leaving Obergefell’s 
protections for same-sex couples vulnerable.  
Courts discredit the necessity of a tiers-of-scrutiny analysis by 
avoiding the question. Instead, courts should definitively rule on the 
appropriate level of scrutiny—possibly strict scrutiny, if same-sex 
couples are seen as a suspect class, or at least intermediate scrutiny, as in 
gender discrimination cases. Given the Supreme Court’s own reluctance, 
however, it is unlikely that lower courts will soon establish which level 
of scrutiny should apply to same-sex marriage cases. 
